St. John's Law Review
Volume 1
Number 2 Volume 1, May 1927, Number 2

Article 1

Credit Bureau Functions of Trade Associations: The Legal
Aspects
David L. Podell
Benjamin S. Kirsh

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S

LAW REVIEW
'VOL I

MAY 1927

No. 2

CREDIT BUREAU FUNCTIONS OF TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS: THE LEGAL ASPECTS

p

ROBLEMS extremely vital to the development and progress
of American business are presented in the question: "What is
the legal scope of trade association activities?"
The complexity of modem industry, the enlargement of the
world markets through greater facility for intercommunication, the
multitudinous ramifications of big business, have all argued for a
better co-operation, particularly among business units of moderate
size. As a result American industry today consists of a network of trade associations spreading throughout the land.
Many of our economists, and certain of our judges, who
have given thought and study to this development, are finn in the
conviction that the trade association often affords relief against
the operations of gigantic and oppressive monopolies.
That the merchant or manufacturer of moderate size may
band with his fellows in an effort to secure scientific knowledge
concerning his own trade or business cannot now be doubted.
How far may that group proceed to the formation of rules of
conduct for its members, impose penalties for their breach, and,
adopt regulations, designed to protect the membership against
fraudulent and irresponsible debtors?
Since 1921 the Supreme Court of the United States has had
occasion to record five decisions,' approving or disapproving cer'American Column & Lumber Co., et al. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 377 (1921)
(Hardwood Case); U. S. v. American Linseed Oil Co., et al. 262 U. S.
371 (1923) (Linseed Oil Case); Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n, et aL v. U. S.
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tain practices pursued by a large number of these trade associations. The legal limits of their credit bureau functions, both
under the anti-trust laws and under the general law of torts, are
still in the process of being outlined. These present essentially
business problems which must be studied in conjunction with the
business life of the day.
The time has come for the law to place a proper estimate
upon the service and utility rendered by credit organizations and
credit men, in introducing scientific knowledge and expert guidance in the place of mere guesswork and rumor. This evaluation, by the law, of the needs of business, is most necessary in
order to approach the solution of the question as to how far
protective measures in the extension of credit are necessary, and
how vigorous they must be in order to be useful.
The outstanding value of an organized, expert, and intelligent guidance to manufacturers and merchants, in the extension
of credit, can best be learned from the experience of business
itself. The mercantile credit organization, either general, such
as Dun and Bradstreet, or special, so as to include only one
industry or one group of industries, has become firmly imbedded
in our business structure. The ever increasing complexities of
business have made it impracticable for each individual business
man to maintain his own credit organization. The need for cooperation with his fellows has long since made itself felt. And it
is apparent that, even though agreements regarding credit protection
have been entered into, their general purpose has been to aid each
individual to form a somewhat more careful judgment in extending further credit to an already delinquent debtor. These credit
services are all, in substance, merely the logical, large scale extensions of the introduction of reliable aid in credit matters.
The issues fairly to be presented for judicial determination,
within the course of the next few years, will involve the setting
of the lawful boundaries of collective efforts on the part of the
trade associations, to protect and safeguard their members effectively against the wasteful extension of credit to fraudulent
and irresponsible purchasers, and to eliminate unsound credit.
268 U. S. 563 (1925)

(Maple Flooring Case); Cement Mfrs' Ass'n, et aL.

v. U. S. 268 U. S. 588 (1925) (Cement Case); U. S. v. Trenton Potteries
et al. Decided Feb. 21, 1927, October Term, 1926 (Potteries Case).
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Since the decisions in the Maple Flooring and Cement cases,
the doctrine of restraint of trade has now reached that stage
in its development, 3 where collective activity on the part of those
engaged in an industry is not necessarily in violation of law.
Therefore, the statement of the economist, Adam Smith, that
"people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance t6 raise prices,"' is no
longer of universal application.
The authoritative view of the Supreme Court,5 leaves it free
from doubt that the general purpose of credit bureaus, is proper
and beneficial, as the clearing house for material information.
But the legality of the various methods employed has not yet
been definitely determined. It is to this problem that we must
turn our attention.
The inherent difficulty of a logical analysis lies in the fact,
that what we have termed essentially a business problem, must
be viewed in the light of legal concepts evolved in days when
industry was far less complex and advanced than today. The
law of restraint of trade, similar to the law of torts generally, is
not of fixed mathematical content; but adjusts itself flexibly and
elastically, and changes with the economic and social views of
our industrial order.6 Likewise, the law is profoundly influenced

'Supra, note 1.
I Compare dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Hardwood Case, supra,
note 1, with majority opinions of Stone, J., in Maple Flooring and Cement
Cases supra, note 1. See also the thoughtful and interesting discussion of
these cases by Prof. Probst, The Failure of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
(1926) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 122; and by Prof. Oliphant, Trade Associations
and The Law (1926) 26"Col. L. Rev. 381. And passim, Proceedings of
Academy of Political Science, Vol. XI, Jan. 1926; American Economic
Review, Vol. XVI, No. 1, pps. 203-239, Mch. 1926.
'Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (10th Ed. 1802) 200.
"'Distribution of information as to credit and responsibility of buyers
undoubtedly prevents fraud and cuts down to some degree commercial transactions which would' otherwise be induced by fraud." Cement Case, supra,
note 1, p. 604.
'Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, p. 351, note. "Hence it became
needful to recognize that restrictions which appeared extravagant in the sixteenth or eighteenth century might be no more than reasonable in the nineteenth; and here we may see one of our lady's most remarkable successes.
Without any legislation, without express disapproval of a single received
authority, the law as to agreements in restraint of trade has in our own
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by the necessary practices of business, and will consider them
permissible if, on the whole, the benefits from their adoption outweigh the infliction of any incidental temporal damage upon third
parties.'
We are not without precedents and analogies. The history
of the law of restraint of trade illustrates the point forcibly.
This has been the subject of several classical reviews. 8 From
these historical summaries, one can readily follow the opening of
the wide gulf which separates the declaration of the unlawfulness
of any restriction upon trade, as in the early Dyers' case, reported in the Year Books,9 from the approval of the co-operative
agreements of the Fur Dyers' Case,"" reported in the year 1925.
It is merely proof that the legal justification, under the common
law, for collective activity, grows as society progresses industrially. The problems are made difficult, not only because of
conflict in the legal principles; but even the close student of law
will struggle hard to separate the rationale of the cases, from
elaborate discussions of general principles, added to the opinions
by way of dicta. We must also remember the instructive language concerning the decision of trade association cases, contained
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the Maple Flooring case :12
time effected a change of front that has brought it completely into line with
modern business conditions." " Sir Frederick Pollock, Genius of the Common law, p. 98.
"* * * the pressure of less immediate social interests, and the need of

reconciling them with the exigencies of the general security, and of making
continual new compromises because of continual changes in society, has
called ever for readjustment at least of the details of the social order. It
has called continually for overhauling of legal precepts and for refitting of

them to unexpected situations." Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of
Law, p. 18.
"The principle on which the doctrine of conditional privilege rests is
that the public interest and advantage of publication in each particular class
of cases outweighs the occasional private damage thereby caused." Prof.
Jeremiah Smith, Conditional Privilege (1914) 14 Col. L. Rev. 189, 190.
"See opinion of Taft, J., in U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898), and opinion of White, C. J., in Standard
Oil Co. of N. J. et at. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1 (1911). Also scholarly articles of

Franklin D. Jones, The Historical Development of the Law of Business

Competition, (1926) 35 Yale Law Journal 905; 36 Yale Law Journal 42
et seq.; 207 et seq.; 351 et seq. Williston, Contracts (1926) §1633 et seq.
'Dyer's case, 2 Hen. V, fol. 5, pl. 26.
' 0 U. S. v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers' Ass'n, Inc., et al., 5 Fed. (2nd)
869 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1925).
' Supra, note 1, p. 579.
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"It should be said at the outset, that in considering the
application of the rule of decision in these cases to the situation presented by this record, it should be remembered
that this court has often announced that each case arising
under the Sherman Act must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the record, and that the opinion in
those cases must be read in the light of their facts and of
a clear recognition of the essential differences in the facts
of those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which
the rule of earlier decisions is to be applied."
While this limitation upon precedent makes more difficult the
solution of the problem, of each specific case, we can nevertheless
be guided by the plain prohibitions of certain practices, which have
been definitely frowned on by the courts, and by the approval of
certain other practices, which have been held valid, in the absence
of an agreement to fix -prices or limit production.
VALUE

OF

CO-OPERATION

AND EXPERT

KNOWLEDGE

IN

EXTENSION OF CREDIT

The legal analysis of the workings of the credit bureau
would be barren without a recognition of its value in the present
industrial fabric. It is outside the scope of this article to deal
with the methods and technique of credit operation, now in general
use throughout the country. They are thoroughly collated in the
pamphlet issued by the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States entitled "Commercial Organization Credit Bureaus,"'13 and
also in the publication of the Department of Commerce, entitled
"Trade Association Activities."'"
Its usefulness to our present
day society is stated as follows:
"A credit bureau adequately organized and efficiently handled * * * educates the community in the meaning of

credit by orienting for its credit givers the standing of its
credit seekers. * * * A credit record can be established

which will assure accommodation during a period of misfortune, or reputation may be acquired which will cut off
every credit avenue. * * * People who know these things
are given incentive to make their actions measure to the
"Published by the Organization Service Bureau of the Chamber of
Commerce, November, 1922.
"Government Printing Office, 1923; prepared by Warford and May.
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credit standard. A credit bureau which realizes its possibilities, quickens and invigorates the ethics of business relations in its community." 15
The relative value of the services of a credit expert in
comparison with the other usual sources, such as salesmen's
reports, attorneys' reports, references supplied by applicant,
banks, general reputation, etc., is obvious. While trade opinions,
agency reports, and rating books have all been useful, nevertheless
often they have not been up to date. However, the books of all
the houses with which business relations are carried on contain
a wealth of unbiased facts concerning merchants who seek
credit. By assembling all this information the paying habits of
the credit seeker, the amount of his account, trade indebtedness,
and the general experience of creditors with him, would be unfolded. The need for obtaining this information has convinced
credit executives that they should interchange their ledger facts.' 6
DECISIONs

DEALING WITH CREDIT

CO-OPERATION

AND GUIDANCE

With the value of organized and expert credit information
clearly before us, we can pass to a consideration 'of the legal
authorities on this subject. The problems of law arising from
"Supra, note 13, p. 5.

And see generally Hagerty, "Mercantile Credit,"

who adds, at p. 144--"The agency contributes one of its chief services in
working out a selective process by which the weaker members of the mercantile community are eliminated, and the most capable are permitted to
survive."
"The value of credit interchange has been so exhaustively stated
that we are taking the liberty of summarizing it as follows: Invaluable in 1. revising accounts; 2. helping eliminate undesirable buyers; 3. determining upon granting extension of credit; 4. giving information and
advice by those who know; 5. disclosing whether accounts are discounted or
paid when due; 6. minimizing bad debt waste; 7. aiding to keep tab on
special accounts; 8. keeping credit files up to minute with latest information; 9. telling wh'en customer overpays or buys in other than his legitimate
territory; 10. telling whether customer pays new creditors promptly and
lets others wait; 11. sometimes disclosing that one is not a principal
creditor; 12 invaluable in aiding houses selling small accounts; 13. securing
advantage of several years' experience in bureau through one free reciprocal
report; 14. giving ante-mortem not post-mortem reports; 15. in aiding,
through reciprocal reports, decisions whether to reopen former customer's
account; 16. assembling and disclosing reliable and dependable information
from active ledger accounts.-Abridged from Schluter, "Credit Analysis,"
p. 35, quoting Secretary-treasurer of Cleveland Credit Interchange Bureau.
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co-operation in the collection and dissemination of credit information, depend first, upon the purpose of the collective activity,
secondly, on the means adopted, and finally, upon a consideration
of how effective a policy must be resorted to, in order to protect members of the association against the frauds and irresponsibilities of delinquent debtors. The great weight of authority
permits the mere gathering and distribution of relevant credit
information, to one who has an interest and to whom there is
owing a legal or moral duty. 17 This has been conceded both
in cases arising under the anti-trust laws,' and also in those
brought for defamation. 9 But where the facts establish a motive to injure the plaintiff rather than to further the legitimate
interests of the members of the association, the rule is necessarily different. 2 So that an agreement to compel payment by
coercive means is unlawful, 21 and likewise, misrepresentation or
concealment of the fact that the debtor honestly disputes his
2
claim, will subject the reporting member to liability."
"Xique v. Bradstreet, 70 Hun. (N. Y.) 334 (1893), affirmed 141 N. Y.
605 (1894) and notes 18 and 19, post.
"U. S. v. Swift & Co., 196 U. S. 375 (1905) ; U. S. v. Gypsum Industries
Ass'n, et at., U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Decree entered January 3, 1923, by Knox, D. J. See also correspondence
between Secretary of Commerce Hoover and Attorney-General Daugherty,
dated Feb., 1922, appearing at p. 324, Jones, "Trade Association Activities
and the Law."
"Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868); Cooley, Torts (3rd Ed.
1906), 439-440.
'Brown v. Tregoe, 236 N. Y. 497, 500 (1923).
"Traynor v. Sielaff, 62 Minn. 420, 64 N. W. 915 (1895); McIntyre v.
Weinert, 195 Pa. 52 45 AtI. 666 (1900); Masters v. Lee, 39 Neb. 574, 58
N. W. 222 (1894); and note 22 et seq., infra. So also, unwarranted and
unreasonable methods of collection, will remove the privilege. Muetze v.
Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123 (1890) (envelopes in large type, bearing
inscription, "For collecting bad debts," sent thru the mails to delinquent
debtors); State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604 (1891) ("Bad
Debt Collection Agency," on conspicuous envelopes sent thru mails) ; Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, 181 Ky. 487, 205 s. W. 558 (1918) (placarding
debtor's dwelling with yellow cards demanding payment).
"Trapp v. DuBois, 76 App. Div. 314 (2nd Dept. 1902), vilhere the court
based its decision upon the following review of the facts: "Defendant did
not disclose to the association the facts of the controversy as to the liability
and solvency of the plaintiff. He let it be inferred that the plaintiff was
pecuniarily unable to pay a trifling bill of eleven dollars." See also Turner,
v. O'Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N. W. 584 (1918).
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It is obvious that in order to avoid liability under the ordinary rules of negligence, the collection of this information should
be entrusted only to those who are qualified, by competence and
experience, to deal with a subject which involves no less a matter
than trading in the financial reputation of merchants. In addition, it is also important that precaution be taken in verifying the
accuracy of the information submitted to the credit reporter.
And further, where an agreement is entered into, whereby
the members of an association refuse to deal with a debtor of one
of them, the decisions hold the practise unlawful. We shall refer
to some of the leading cases.
In the Tile case, U. S. v. Alexander & Reid,28 Van Fleet J.
says:
"The first of these practices provided for in other
articles is the 'stop notice.' In brief, the stop notice meant
this: Upon the request of any one member, the Secretary
of the Association would send out a so-called stop notice
to all of the other members of the Association. The effect
of that notice was an immediate boycott of all the members
of the Association against the individual or particular contractor engaged in erecting an apartment house, which
would completely tie his hands and paralyze his work, until
he came to terms with the member causing the issuance of
the notice, regardless of which was in the right in the
matter in difference between them. The employment of
this method of boycott has been justly and severely condemned by the Courts."
To the same effect is the opinion in the case of Brescia
2
Construction Co. v. Stone Masons Constructors Association et al., 4
where Greenbaum J. says:
"It seems to us clear that the provisions of the agreement between the defendants which obligated * * * the
members of the defendant-unions not to do any work 'for
or under any contractor, builder, corporation or persons
owing money to any member of the Stone-Masons Contractors Association for work performed or materials furnished,' are illegal and against public policy. * * * The
agreement contemplates that the labor unions will assist
"280 Fed. 924, 926 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1922).
1195 App. Div. (N. Y.) 647, 654 (1st Dept. 1921).
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in collecting by arbitrary and oppressive measures claims
thus asserted. * * * In other words, instead of according
alleged debtors the right to have their disputes determined
by the legal tribunals established for that purpose, the defendant associations have constituted themselves the judges
of the facts and the law and the agencies for enforcing
their unauthorized decrees."
In Dorchy v. The State of Kansas,25 Brandeis J. says:
"To collect a stale claim due to a fellow member of
the union who was formerly employed in the business is
not a permissible purpose. - - -* In the absence of a valid
agreemenf to the con trar3, each party to a disputed claim
may insist that it be determined only by a court. *
*
To enforce payment by a strike is clearly coercion."
In U. S. v. Southern Wholesale Grocers Association," the
Court says:
"It may be conceded as contended by the plaintiff,
that a contract between many engaged in the same business
to refrain from selling to an individual or a class would be
an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, unenforcible at law and subjecting
the participants to a crim27
inal prosecution thereunder."
Within the limits of the two boundaries just discussed,
there is an intermediate area, where the law is now beginning
to take definite form; but the danger zone is invaded, when we
approach the consideration of the two following problems:
(1) May members of a trade association enter into
an agreement to refuse to extend credit to a prospective
customer owing a debt to any member of the association,
and insist upon cash on or before delivery as a condition to
further dealing with any members?
and
(2) Are any comments, opinions, or suggestions by
the credit expert of the trade association, derogatory to the
credit of a prospective customer, permitted by law?
=71 Law. Ed. 23 (U. S. S. C.), decided Oct. 25, 1926.
' 207 Fed. 434, 439 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1913).
Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo. App. 64, 71 S. W. 691
(1903) ; U. S. v. King, 229 Fed. 275 (D. C. D. Mass. 1915) ; Masters v. Lee,
39 Neb. 574, 58 N. W 222 (1894); Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56
N. E. 619 (1900); Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085 (1904);
Accord.
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A discussion of these problems necessitates an analysis of
28
two recent decisions under the Federal anti-trust laws.
Perhaps one of the most far reaching cases decided under
the anti-trust laws is the case of the United States v. Fur
Dressers' and Fur Dyers' Association. 29 In this case, the
United States filed a bill in equity against the Fur Dressers'
and Fur Dyers' Association. The provisions of the Constitution and by-laws of the association, which the government complained of, authorized the following practices: Lists of customers
who failed to pay their overdue accounts to members of the
association were distributed to the members for their information and no delivery of dressed or dyed skins was to be made
to any person, by any member, so long as the name of that person appeared upon that list, except upon payment of cash or by
check upon delivery of the skins. The rules of the association
prohibited the listing of customers other than those whose bills
were overdue, and were equally certain in requiring the immediate removal of the name of a delinquent customer from the list.
upon the payment of those bills. Where the customer honestly
disputed the unpaid account, his name was neither listed nor
circulated.
It is important to note that there was no agreement compelling an absolute refusal to deal.30 Nor was there any other
attempt made to coerce him into paying his claim. 31'
The members of the Association were entirely at liberty
to deal with the customer, if he would pay cash. The only
effect of the rule was to prevent members of the Association
from extending further credit to an already delinquent debtor.
If, therefore, the customer was financially responsible, and was
willing to pay cash, he was able to deal with the members freely.
Necessarily, therefore, there was no concerted malevolence
directed by members of the association against the debtor. Bondy,
'U. S. v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers' Ass'n, supra, note 10. Cement
Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. U. S., supra, note 1.
"Supra, note 10.
"See Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. U. S.234 U S. 600 (1914), Weston v. Barnicoat, supra, note 27; U. S. v. Southern Wholesale Grocers Ass'n,
supra, note 26.
' See note 21 et seq., supra.
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J, held that the agreement did not affect those who owed no
money, but merely those who had failed to pay their debts, and
that it did not go beyond the reasonable requirement, to check
32abuses which had crept into the trade.
In Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. U. S.,1 3 the
facts dealing with the Credit Bureau function were as follows:
The members of the Association rendered monthly reports of all
accounts of customers two months or more overdue, giving the
name and address of the delinquent dealer, the amount of the
overdue account in ledger balance, accounts in hands of attorneys
for collection, and any explanation, as for example, when the
account was treated by the debtors as offset of a balance due for
bags, or was otherwise disputed. There were also reports showing
the general total of delinquent accounts in comparison with those
for the last twelve months, reports of payments of accounts
placed in the hands of attorneys, and a form, seldom used, for
answering inquiries as to whether a particular name had appeared
in the monthly report. The Court further stated the facts as
follows :3
"There were never any comments concerning names
appearing on the list of delinquent dealers. The government neither charged nor proved that there was any
agreement with respect to the use of this information, or
with respect to the persons to whom or conditions under
which credit should be extended. The evidence falls short
of establishing any understanding on the basis of which
credit was to be extended to customers or that any cooperation resulted from the distribution of this information,
or that there were any consequences from it other than
such as did naturally ensue from the exercise of the individual judgment of manufacturers in determining on the
basis of available information, whether to extend credit or
to require cash or security from any given customer."
It must be borne in mind that the above statements were made
by the court, in a review of the facts presented by the record
Perhaps this authority loses some force in view of the fact that in the
latter portion of the opinion, the petition is dismissed on the further ground
that the defendants were not engaged in interstate commerce.
'Supra, note 1.
"Pp.

599-600.
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in the case. In summarizing those facts, Mr. Justice Stone
grouped and classified them under their respective headings.
The statements in question are found under one of these
headings, but the record apparently discloses no comments or
any agreement to limit credit. Therefore, it can be seen that
no rule of law, with respect to the absent facts, should be drawn
therefrom, since no such evidence was before the court. This
contention is fortified by the arrangement of the opinion. The
portion we noted comes from the statement of facts. Thereafter, the applicable law is discussed under the caption, "Legal
Consequences of Defendant's Activities." The case merely decides that in the absence of such evidence, the practices are not
unlawful; it does not hold that if any of those facts were present, the result would necessarily have been otherwise. It may
justly be inferred that those problems were left open for future
35
adjudication.
Referring to the lawfulness of the agreement to extend
credit in the Fur Dressers' and Fur Dyers' Case,3 6 it has been
stated :1
"It may well be doubted however that this will ultimately prevail. It is significant that the Supreme Court in
a subsequent decision (Cement Case), upholding a purely
voluntary arrangement for providing information declared,
*

*

*"P

And then follows the portion of the opinion which we have
quoted above. Again, it is said :38
"While the Supreme Court has recently reversed the
judgment upon which this decree rested it plainly indicated
that had there been such evidence its decision would have
been different."
But we respectfully submit that an improper construction has
been placed upon the language of the court for the reasons
stated above. Nor do we think that a credit agreement is of
the same essence as agreements to fix prices. The experience
quotation and discussion referred to in note 12.
= supra, note 28.
' Trade Associations-Their Economic Significance and Legal Status,
p. 153; National Industribd Conference Board, New York, 1925.
' Ibid., p. 155.
'See
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of the law has been that to permit prices to be fixed, by agreement, means ultimately high prices. But the benefits of the
credit function were recognized by the court in this very case.
The weight of judicial authority appears to be in accord with
the opinion of Bondy J., upholding agreements of this nature.
It is true that none of the decided cases directly involved the
federal or state anti-trust statutes. They dealt with cases in tort,
but the same underlying legal principles were before the court.
In Reynolds v. Plumbers' Material Protective Association, 39 an'
association, pursuant to its by-laws, sent to each of its members
a statement of a customer's delinquency in paying his debts, and
as a result its members were prohibited from selling goods to him,
except for cash on delivery, while the account remained unpaid.
Judgment was awarded to the defendant in an action for libel.
It was urged that the statute, under which the association was
organized, was void as being in restraint of trade and against
public policy, and was no justification for the defendant's conduct.
But the Court held:
"Merchants have a right to deal with whomever they
choose. They have a right to sell their goods on credit, or
to demand a cash payment; and it is not unlawful for any
number of persons to organize under the statute to protect
themselves in trade, and they may agree not tb sell their
goods on credit, and such an act would not be in restraint
of trade or against public policy."
In Woodhouse v. Powles, 40 the members of the wholesale
grocery association agreed to report delinquent dealers and to
refuse to give credit until their debts to members were paid. There
the Court declared:
"Courts, it is true, uniformly hold it libelous for a
person or association of persons to attempt to coerce the
payment of debts by holding the debtors out to the world
as being dishonest and unworthy of credit, or to publish
their names in circulars, pamphlets, and books for distribution among dealers, as persons who have contracted
debts and failed to pay them; but no court, so far as we
are advised, has held it unlawful for dealers in a common
r'63 N. Y. Supp. 303, Aff'd 169 N. Y. 614 (1900).
043 Wash. 617; 86 Pac. 1063 (1906).
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line of goods to agree among themselves not to extend
credit to a person who had defaulted in a payment to
some one of them."
In Putnal v. Inman,4 1 the Court held valid an agreement
among merchants not to extend credit to a delinquent debtor
without assuming his indebtedness to any other member of the
association; and distinguished such an agreement from "blacklisting or boycotting by refusing to deal." 42
The question as to how far comments and advice are permitted to the credit expert of the trade association, has received
relatively meagre discussion in the reported cases.
It has been

summarized

by a leading

text writer

43

as

follows:

"In the operation of such a bureau, the following principles should be closely adhered to:
"First, the association should act solely as the conduit
for the exchange of experiences of its members. In other
words, it should merely compile and distribute the naked
facts without reporting any conclusion as to the responsibility or acts of the parties reported.
"Second, the association should make no recommendation, either express or implied, through its officers, or by
"76 Fla. 553; 80 So. 316 (1918).
' See Hartnett v. Plumber Supply Association, 169 Mass. 299, 47 N. E.,
1002 (1897), where a distinction appears to be drawn between tradesmen
entering into an agreement in their individual capacities, and an incorporated
organization. In that opinion, the following appears: "The credit of a
tradesman is an important, and often his most considerable resource, and
he has a right to rely upon and to use it in endeavoring to do business.
No one has a right to attempt to destroy or to injure his credit, unless the
person so attempting can show that his own legitimate interests require
such action. Assuming that the legitimate interests of sellers of plumbers'
supplies may justify such persons in informing each other that a customer
of one of them has not paid for his purchases, and in agreeing with each
other to sell him no goods except for cash before delivery, the respondent
has no such justification for its interference with the petitioner's business.
The respondent is a legal person other than and distinct from its members."
See also, Hartman v. Hyman and Lieberman, 287 Pa. 78, 82, 134 Atl. 486
(1926), where the court apparently refused to follow the view of the court
below (87 Pa. Sup. Ct. 358), that there is no distinction between an agreement to refuse to deal and an agreement not to extend credit, and affirms
the decision of the lower court on other grounds.
"Franklin D. Jones, Trade Association Activities and the Law, p. 185.
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consideration and findings by special committees, as to any
action the members should take regarding parties concerning
whom information is given."
Is this a final statement of the legal principles involved? To
answer this question, we must look to the law concerning nercantile agencies, both in England and in this country, for the most
instructive analogies. Perhaps the most exhaustive and able arguments presented for the extension of the rights and privileges of
credit organizations, whatever the form, are the two articles by
Professor Jeremiah Smith, entitled "Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies-Macintosh v. Dun."' 44 The value of these articles
lies in pointing out that the expert credit services rendered by the
mercantile agency and the mutual credit associations are reasonably
necessary methods of obtaining information. They are a powerful
plea that the law take account of modem business customs and
practices, which are in general use, and which have already become an integral part of present day commercial enterprise.
Whatever the exact legal relation between the business man and
the credit expert, the doctrine of conditional privilege is sufficiently broad to afford adequate protection, because the policy
of the law requires that business men be entitled to an efficient
means of acquiring information which is necessary for the protection of their legitimate business interests.
Professor Smith's articles were provoked as a protest against
the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in
the case of Macintosh v. Dun.45 In this case, an action had been
brought for libel against the respondents, who were engaged in
the business of obtaining information with reference to the commercial standing of persons in New South Wales, and in imparting such information confidentially to its subscribers in response
to specific and confidential inquiries.
Two reports in writing, which were alleged by the plaintiff to be defamatory, had been sent to a subscriber in response
to his inquiry, concerning the credit standing of the plaintiff. The
question at issue was whether, under the circumstances of the
case, the defense of conditional privilege was good in law. The
Court, per Lord Macnaghten, said :45a
14 Col. L. Rev., pp. 187-210, 296-320 (1914).
'L. R. (1908) A. C. 390.
" Ibid., p. 400.
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"Then comes the real question: Is it in the interest
of the community, is it for the welfare of society, that the
protection which the law has permitted in cases of legitimate
self-defense, or from a bona fide sense of duty, should be
extended to communications made from motives of selfinterest by persons wrho trade for profit in the characters of
their principal
And again :1-

"It has been stated that in this country there is no
authority directly in point. There are direct authorities in
the United States in favor of the conclusion at which the
High Court has arrived. American authorities are, no
doubt, entitled to the highest respect. But this is a question
that must be decided by English Law. In the dearth of
English authority it seems to their Lordships that recourse
must be had to the principle on which the law in England
on this subject is founded. With the utmost deference to
the learned judges of the High Court, their Lordships are
of the opinion that the decision under appeal is not in accordance with that principle."
The court accordingly held that, since the defendants were actuated by the motive of making a profit, that they were not entitled to the defense of privilege. As the Court stated, the decision
was contrary to the weight of American authority.
The case was severely criticized by Professor Smith in the
following summary:
"As to matters of fact: The opinion evinces unfamiliarity with the methods and practical necessities of modern
business. The writer does not appear to realize fully either
the nature or the importance of the information furnished
by mercantile agencies. It is an attempt to establish a rule
of law founded upon a mistake of fact as to the reasonable
necessity of adopting certain modern business methods.
"As to matters of law: The opinion leaves out of
view the chief principle by which an agent finds protection
under the legitimate interest of his employer. The opinion
does not pay sufficient heed to the chief reason for holding
the occasion prima facie privileged, viz., to protect the interest of the recipient. The writer does not appear to
realize fully that conditional protection of a mercantile
Ibid., p. 401.
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agency, if allowed by law, would be allowed as a necessary
means or incident to the protection of the recipient, rather
than on account
of any special merit on the part of the
4
informant.

,

The decision, he argued, was based on too narrow a conception of public policy. It eems apparent that the giving of
confidential communications to the principal by an agent, actually
employed to obtain facts as to the solvency, credit, and standing
of a prospective customer, is privileged. And if one business
man may thus employ his private agent, to acquire and send in
such data, there would seem to be no objection, in law, to a
combination of two or more business men employing such an
agent. Consequently, if an agent may act for several, he may
engage in this business for a livelihood. Thus the element of
profit is immaterial. The crucial issue is not whether the credit
agency has, as its motive, pecuniary gain, but whether it acts in a
47
bona fide and careful manner.
But it is now unnecessary to join with Professor Smith in his
scathing criticism of the far reaching implications of the language used by the court in Macintosh v. Dun. Its holding was
curtailed and restricted, in a very large measure, by the subsequent decision of the House of Lords in the case of London
48
Association for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, Limited,
where the defense of privilege was held to be good.
An action had been brought for libel against an unincorporated mutual association of tradesmen, its credit officer, and
another. The following is a summary of the facts material to
the subject matter under discussion;
The only qualification for membership in the association
was the payment of a nominal annual subscription. One of the
objects of the association was the answering of specific inquiries
concerning the means and trustworthiness of business men. Each
member of the asioiation was annually supplied with several
inquiry forms, which, upon being sent to the office of the association, entitled him to receive information with respect to any
'Ibid., pp. 310-311.
S7 U. Pa. L. Rev. 178.
-2 A. C. (1916) 15.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

particular individual, firm, or corporation doing business in the
United Kingdom. The form of application for membership
contained the following provision:
"Every member undertakes to keep the information
supplied by the association in strict confidence, and for his
exclusive use, and not divulge it to any members upon any
pretext whatever."
The association did not carry on business for profit; thus
eliminating the most important feature which had deprived the
defendant of the privilege in Macintosh v. Dun. The action
in the London Association case arose from the sending to a
subscriber, in response to his direct inquiry, of what was alleged
to be a detrimental statement of plaintiff's credit standing. In
determining the question, the Court referred to the doctrine announced in Macintosh v. Dun, and distinguished the case at bar
from that decision. The principles of law which governed the
instant case, it said, had been announced by Baron Parke in
Toogood v. Spyring.49 In that case, the Court held that any
communication,
"fairly made by a person in the discharge of some
public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the
conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is
concerned,"
was privileged, and again, that
"If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or
exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society;
and the law has not restricted the right to make them within
any narrow limits."
The learned Lord Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster, said :5
"Indeed, the circumstances that constitute a privileged
occasion can themselves never be catalogued and rendered
exact. New arrangements of business, even new habits of
life, may create unexpected combinations of circumstances
which, though they differ from well-known instances of
privileged occasion, may none the less fall well within the
plain yet flexible language of the definition to which I have
referred."
1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
Supra, note 48, at p. 22.
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The Lord Chancellor pointed out that in Macintosh v. Dun,
the association had been conducted for profit by certain people,

who were wholly unconnected with the trade. They had acquired, from all sources, information about merchants, and carried on the business of disseminating this opinion for pecuniary
reward. Under such circumstances, it had been decided by the
Privy Council that such communication had not been made and
discharged either under a public or a private duty. Lord Buckmaster further stated:51

"That decision leaves untouched the wider question as
to whether groups of people, however large, may not combine together in order to provide the necessary information
for carrying on business. They can themselves control,
through their committee the person by whom the inquiries
are made and the method by which such inquiries are conducted, and they obviously have an interest in not receiving
inaccurate and misleading statements, for no man in trade
is desirous to avoid entering into a profitable trade transaction; his only interest is to render himself secure by the
disclosure of trustworthy information."
In the concurring opinion of Lord Parker of Waddington ap52
pears the following significant language.
"My Lords, if a person may himself legitimately inquire
as to the credit of another, it must necessarily follow that
he is justified in making the inquiry through an agent
confidentially employed for that purpose; and if a person
asked for information may himself give it, he may give it
through an agent whom he employs for that purpose. * * *
If a trader is justified in making inquiries through an
agent on a proper occasion as to the credit of another,
it can make no difference whether the agent receives, or
does not receive, a remuneration for his services. Again,
if a single trader is justified in making an inquiry through
an agent there is no reason why two or more traders so
justified, should not combine to pay a common agent, to
make, on behalf of each, as occasion arises, such inquiry as
may be necessary. A common agent so paid and making an
inquiry at the request of any particular trader would not be
the agent for that purpose of all the traders who joined in
Ibid., p. 27.

"Ibid., p. 42 and 43.
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providing his salary, but only of that particular trader at
whose instance the inquiry was made, just as if two persons
employed a common chauffeur to drive the motor car of
each as required, such chauffeur would not be the agent of
the one while employed in the driving the car of the other."
We have examined the English Law with respect to mercantile agencies and protective credit associations at such length
because the legal principles favoring the wider extensions of
their powers have developed less rapidly in the mother country
than in the American courts. But even in England, the absence of the element of service for compensation, seems to have
gained for the voluntary credit organization the right to set up,
as a defense, a conditional privilege in reporting credit data.
The anomaly in the American law appears to be that the
mercantile agency, conducted for profit, has already acquired the
immunity of the defense of conditional privilege, while the voluntary, non-profit making trade association has not yet established
similar rights and privileges.
This curious contrast between the development of the
English and American law on this point, can be better understood
by reference to the leading reported cases to be found in this
country. As early as 1868 in Ormsby v. Douglass " the New
York Court of Appeals declared that the rule of privilege applies
to a mercantile agency employed to procure information as to
the solvency, credit and standing of another. In that case, the
defendant maintained a mercantile agency. In the course of its
business and by the terms of its subscription, it gave confidential
and material information to one of its customers upon his request.
It stated that the plaintiff was a "man of no responsibility; he
was a bad man and worked for counterfeiters; and was a counterfeiter." In the course of its opinion the Court said:
"And the agent may properly be paid for his time, labor
and expense in the pursuit of such information. If one
merchant may employ his own private agent to seek and
communicate such information, there is no legal objection
to the combination or union of two or more in the employment of the same agent." 54
O"37 New York 477 (1868).

" Ibid., p. 495.
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In 1889, Sherwood C. J. said in Mooney v. Davis :'--"These agencies have become almost a necessity in the
transaction of commercial business, and the rules by which
they are governed, and the information they gather and
impart, are well-known to business and commercial men
chiefly, and such information is perhaps more frequently
relied upon than that obtained from all other sources, and
courts cannot shut their eyes to these facts. '
In Kingsbury v. Bradstreet, 57 an action was brought against
a mercantile agency for libel for sending to its subscribers a circular wherein the name of the plaintiff appeared with two stars
opposite. The two stars indicated that the reader should look
to the margin of the sheet for an explanation. There they referred to the following words: "For explanation please call at our
office." Because the communication had been generally circulated,
the question of privilege was eliminated. So that, the court
affirmed a judgment directing a verdict for the defendant, on the
ground that, standing by themselves, the words complained of
were incapable of a defamatory meaning.
It must be borne in mind, therefore, that while the utility
of credit organizations has been adequately recognized, the law,
even in the United States, has never looked with favor upon
the general widespread circulation among the entire body of subscribers, without regard to their special interest in any particular
inquiry, of uninvited and unsolicited matter, which tends to be
defamatory of the credit standing of the complaining party.
Such wholesale distribution of credit information is not based
upon the essential interest or duty which is the basis of a
privileged communication, and deprives it of its nature as a
confidential communication.
As was stated by the Court in Sunderlin v. Bradstreet:

s

"Neither the welfare nor convenience of society will
be promoted by bringing a publication of matter, false in
75 Mich. 188, 192, 42 N. W. 802 (1889).
"See also 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 178, 179.
"116 N. Y. 211 (1889) See also Bishop, Non-Contract Law Sec. 305.
Cooley Torts (3rd Ed. 1906) pp. 439-440.

"46 N. Y. 188 (1871) Accord: Taylor v. Church, 4 Seld. (N. Y.) 452
(1853), Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 724 (1893), King v.
Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417, 9 At. 705 (1887).
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fact, injuriously affecting the credit standing of merchants
and traders, broadcast throughout the land, within the protection of privileged communications."
Thus we see, from the above reference to the American
Lases, that the mercantile agency has already achieved a substantially secure position, under the law, as a factor in our
business organization. Shall we, in view of the privileges attained by the mercantile agency, deny to the credit expert of
the trade association, what has been gained by his most powerful colleague doing business as a large national or international
company? Shall we, on the one hand, permit the mercantile
agency to express an expert opinion based upon the information which it has gathered, and deprive the credit expert of
what is to him just as essential and vital a power? A distinction in legal principle would seem to be indefensible.
It is because of the lessons we have learned from the law
of the private mercantile agency that we are reluctant summarily to dismiss the claims of the trade association credit expert,
merely because he essays to indulge in comments, opinions, or
advice. It would indeed seem a strange perversion of the credit
function to permit a scientific accumulation of credit facts, and
at the same time deny an expression of an expert view with
respect to what those facts necessarily mean. The trade association credit bureau should be placed upon a legal parity with
the mercantile agency.
MtOTIVE AND

COMBINATION

AS

ELEMENTS OF

LAWFUL

CONDUCT

This discussion would lack completeness unless we adverted
briefly to certain legal elements, which are constantly being referred to by the courts in similar cases. They are, first, the
effect of a wrongful motive in rendering an act unlawful which
is otherwise lawful, and secondly, whether an act, lawful when
performed by one, becomes unlawful when done jointly by
many.
Problems are here presented which go down deep into the
roots of the common law. We must content ourselves to confine our attention to their application in credit cases, and refer
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the interested reader to the scholarly analyses of the general
principles from the pens of Prof. Ames, 9 Mr. Justice Holmes, 0
Dean Wigmore,61 and Prof. Street. 2
The commentators come substantially to the conclusion that
where the defendants are actuated by a proper motive, and are
conducting their business in the usual and normal manner, that
their conduct, either single or joint, is legally justified. In short,
under a broad doctrine of balancing general social equities, it is
better for some isolated individuals to suffer the incidental damage
incurred, in order that society may derive the benefits from the
activities in which the defendants are engaged. We need only
point out that the most recent cases seem to insist upon the
presence of malevolent motive, as the sine qua non of illegality. s
Can we, therefore, find any reasonable objection to a system of reciprocity and co-operation among business men, who
have combined for their mutual benefit to safeguard themselves
against credit frauds?
It would follow that in credit cases, in which this improper
and wrongful motive is absent, the defendants would be exempt from liability. But we have already seen that a motive to
4
inflict injury will create liability.
We must add a word with respect to whether concerted activity makes conduct, which is lawful when performed by an
individual, illegal. It seems that Ames stated the proper rule:
"The wilful causing of damage to another by a positive act, whether by one man alone, or by several acting in
concert, whether by direct action against him or indirectly by
inducing a third person to exercise a lawful right, is a tort,
unless there is just cause for inflicting the damage." '
"James Barr Ames, "How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the
Wrongful Motive of the Actor," in his "Lectures on Legal History," p. 399.
'Oliver. Wendell Holmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent," in his "Collected Papers," p. 117.
"Wigmore, Tripartite Division of Torts, (1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 200.
'Thomas Atkins Street, "Foundations of Legal Liability," chapter 26.
" Kilmer v. Beardsley, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923) and cases
referred to in the opinion.
"Brown v. Tregoe, supra, note 20.
U Ames, supra, note 59, page 398. A compendium of the leading cases
on. this point is contained in Oakes, "Organized Labor and Industrial
Conflicts," p. 353, et seq., also Appendix D, p. 1079, et seq.

S.

JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

It should be noted that care must be exercised in taking
quotations from their context and applying them to specific instances unrelated to the facts and spirit of the cases from which
they have been taken,"6 such as:
"An act harmless when done by one, may become a
public wrong when done by many acting in concert, for
then it comes in the form of a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to the public
or to the6 7individual against whom the concerted action is
directed.1

The confusion which results from a loose and unwarranted application of this doctrine has been detected by Prof. Sayre. 68 The
acts are not unlawful unless either the object or means of performance are unlawful.
"A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some other
purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means." 9
THE

FEDERAL

ANTI-TRUST

LAWS

AND

COLLECTIVE

CREDIT

FUNCTIONS OF TRADE AssoCIATIONS

It remains for us to consider what are the criteria of lawful
activity under the Federal anti-trust laws other than those
which we have already stated. On this exact point there is a
paucity of direct authority. The statement of the court in the
Cement case bespeaks the spirit in which the statute regards such
collective activity.
" * * * Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular

facts proved, or assumed to he proved, since the generality of the expressions
which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but governed and qualified by particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found." Earl of Halsbury, L. C., Quinn v. Leathern,
House of Lords L. R. (1901) App. Cas. 495.
"Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. U. S. 234 U. S. 600
(1914) quoting from Grenada Lumber Co. v. Miss. 217 U. S. 433 (1910).
"Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922), 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393,
425, et seq.; and see his quotations from various opinions of courts.
' Fuller, C. J., in Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S. 197 (1893).
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Since the announcement of the "rule of reason" in the
Standard Oil case,70 and its restatement and re-affirmation in
several other cases,7 1 it has become plain that not every agreement which restricts or interferes with trade, violates the federal
anti-trust laws, but only those which unduly, unreasonably, and
prejudicially restrain interstate trade and commerce. The usual,
normal, reasonable agreements, necessary to protect and foster
business are not condemned. The decided cases apply various
legal tests, of which six are essentially important:
"The chief factors thus far discussed by the courts in
considering a particular restraint have been (a) its effect,
(b) its extent, (c) its nature, (d) the methods by which
it was effected, (e) the intent of the parties,
and (f) the
'72
particular facts existing in the industry.
But each case depends so much upon its specific facts, that generalizations, are, at times, extremely unsafe guides.
This point of view is emphasized when we recall the language of Brandeis J., in Board of Trade of Chicago v. U. S. :7
"But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test as whether it restrains
competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. * * * The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether
it is such as may suppress and even destroy competition. * * *
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences;"
and a similar passage by Holmes J. in the Window glass case:7'
"' Standard Oil Co. of N. J.et al. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
" Potteries Case, note 1, supra. American Tobacco Co. et al., 221 U. S.
106 (1911).
" Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business
Competition, 1927, 36 Yale L. J.220.
" 246 U. S.231, 238.

"National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. U. S.246 U. S.231, 238.
(1918).
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"If such an agreement can be within the Sherman
Act, at least it is not necessarily so. To determine it legally
requires a consideration of the particular facts."
In view of our discussion of motive and justification, in the
common law cases, it should be noted, 75 that the question of
motive is not altogether controlling under the federal anti-trust
laws, but that a somewhat different test appears to be applied.
But whatever the legal principles invoked, a general balancing of
social equities, which we have already mentioned, is, at bottom,
the real determining factor in the cases.
SUMMARY

From a survey of the decided cases, one can readily note
that the law has already approved and justified the general aim
of collective activity, to safeguard the extension of credit. This
it has done by extending the doctrine of privilege to communications of mercantile agencies to subscribers, made in response to
specific inquiries. Encouraged by the legal, as well as economic,
recognition of their values, these organizations have assumed
national, and even international, importance.
While the mercantile agency has already achieved in the
United States a substantially secure position in the law, as a
factor in our business structure, the trade association credit
bureau has not yet been clothed, by judicial decision, with a
similar immunity. One reason for this appears in the fact that
the trade association depends upon the collective activity of those
engaged in the same industry, and therefore, is subject to further
investigation under the anti-trust laws. But, as we have seen,
the determination of the question depends, at bottom, substantially upon the consideration of its worth to society when com" See opinion of Sutherland, J., in Bedford Stone Co., et al., v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Ass'n North America, et al., of April 11, 1927, United
States Supreme Court, No. 412, Oct. Term 1926, in which is contained the
following significant language: "A restraint of interstate commerce cannot
be justified by the fact that the ultimate object of the participants was to
secure an ulterior benefit which they might have been at liberty to pursue
by meais not involving such restraint." See also: Anderson v. Shipowners'
Ass'n, United States Supreme Court, Decided Nov. 22, 1926, U. S. Duplex
Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468 (1921); Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & Co.,
131 Fed. 182, 186 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904).
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pared with its cost. Likewise, the same reasons which have suspended the penalties of the law of libel, undoubtedly apply as well
under the anti-trust laws.
Where a merchant is impelled to entrust his possessions to
a stranger, in return for a promise to pay therefor in the future,
he is entitled to the fullest light concerning that stranger's character, capacity, and capital,-the three well-known C's of credit.
The trade association with its credit bureau performs essentially the same function as the mercantile agency. Indeed, as we
have seen, since it does not operate on so extensive a scale, its
knowledge with respect to a particular trade is, at times, even
more intimate, reliable, and up-to-date.
This has been effected through the interchange of ledger facts
and other material information from which each can learn the experience of his fellow merchants with a prospective credit risk.
It is only fair, therefore, that the credit bureau of the
trade association should attain the same measure of legal justification for its activities, as the mercantile agency.
It is because of the lessons we have learned from the
law of the mercantile agency, that we are reluctant, for similar
reasons, to dismiss the claims of the trade associations merely
because they indulge in comments, opinions, and advice. It
would unduly 'restrict the credit function, to permit a scientific
collection of credit facts, and at the same time prohibit, under the
penalties of law, an expression of a well-founded view with respect
to what those facts necessarily imply.
To that end, honest expressions and opinions in credit matters should be permitted to those empowered by the members
of the association to voice them. Such an expression of views
should be confined within the limitations of the legal principles
which, as we have already seen, have become fixed by law: that
the information should be collected with due care, 5a and distributed only in answer to the specific inquiry of a member
or subscriber who has an interest, and to whom there is, therefore, a duty owing by the credit officer of the trade association.
"'

Douglass v. Daisley, 114 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. lst., 1902).
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Nor, must there be unfair or unjust means employed, or resort
made to coercion in the collection of unpaid accounts.
Finally, there is to be noted in the recent expressions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, of Secretary of Commerce,
Hoover, and of other students of the subject, a growing tendency
to accord a larger measure of recognition to trade association
activity. The innumerable difficulties encountered by the moderately sized merchant in a complex and extensive market, to secure
accurate and reliable information concerning credit, along with
statistics dealing with production, available supply, costs, standardizafion, and the like, would seem to require a liberal rule for
joint effort.
There is, of course, the danger of the abuse of concentrated
power. That is ever present. No rule of law, however beneficent,
is wholly incapable of abuse. But the mere "existence of unexerted power" to restrain trade, does not, in and of itself, contravene the statute.7 6 There is, on the other hand, a far graver
danger, of according a tremendous advantage to the large-sized
business unit, which has the wealth and means to secure all this
information, and utilize it quite legitimately to effect the destruction of its weaker competitor-the moderate sized merchant.
With the purpose in view of mutual aid in credit matters,
and the elimination of credit frauds which threaten to undermine
our modem business structure, reasonable agreements safeguarding
the extension of further credit to a delinquent debtor, which are
merely in accord with the experience of other merchants in the
same trade, and the expressions of opinions of association credit
bureau experts, made in good faith though derogatory to the credit
seeker, should be adjudged lawful.
DAVID

L.

BENJAMIN

PODELL

S. KmsH

*

New York City.
" U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 451 (1920).
* This is the first of a series of articles to be written by Messrs. Podell
and Kirsh upon the legal aspects of the various functions of Trade Asso-

ciations.

